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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rayland Brown appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Brown with the crime of Forcible Sexual Penetration by 
Use of a Foreign Object, Felony, in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-6608. (41488 
R., p. 20. 1) The Indictment alleged: 
That the defendant, RAYLAND BROWN (aka MICHAEL 
BRADFORD), on or about the 20th day of April 2012, in the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, did, for the purpose of sexual arousal, 
gratification, or abuse, cause the penetration of the vaginal opening 
of another person, to-wit: N.K., by an object, against the will of N.K. 
by use of force or violence. 
(Id.) The state also charged Brown with Battery in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-
903. (41488 R., p. 75.2) The case proceeded to trial, but on the second day of 
trial, Brown changed his plea pursuant to a Rule 11 written plea agreement. (R., 
p. 59.) The parties agreed that Brown would plead guilty to a charge of 
Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child and the state would dismiss the 
Battery charge. (41488 R., pp. 74-76.) Under the Rule 11 plea agreement, the 
district court agreed to retain jurisdiction, but after the period of retained 
jurisdiction the court would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction. (Id.) 
1 This Court granted Brown's motion to augment the record with parts of the 
appellate record from Docket No. 41488 attached as exhibits to Brown's motion 
to augment the record. Citations to the augmentation follow the format "41488 
R." 
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The state filed an Information. The Information alleged: 
That the Defendant, RAYLAND BROWN aka MICHAEL 
BRADFORD, on or about the 20th day of April, 2012, in the County 
Ada, State of Idaho, did actually, intentionally and unlawfully touch 
and or/strike the person of Nancy Kummer against her will while in 
the presence of T.A. an child of the age of 15 years by punching 
and/or striking Nancy Kummer, to-wit: lacerations and/or bruising to 
her face and/or hands and/or ankles, and where Nancy Kummer 
and the Defendant are household members. 
(41488 R., pp. 60-61.) Brown plead guilty to the new charge. (R., p. 59.) On 
December 28, 2012 the district court entered judgment and sentenced Brown to 
20 years with 15 years fixed. (41488 R., pp. 77-79.) The district court retained 
jurisdiction. (Id.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction. (41488 R., pp. 87-89.) Brown subsequently filed a Rule 
35 Motion and appealed his sentence. (R., p. 60.) The district court granted 
Brown's Rule 35 Motion and reduced the sentence to 20 years with 11 years 
fixed. (Id.) Brown's sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. (Id.) 
On July 27, 2014 Brown filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief. 3 (R., pp. 3-14.) Brown asserted that the district court failed to follow the 
terms of the Rule 11 plea agreement and his trial counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting. (R., p. 4.) Brown also moved the district court to appoint post-
2 The record on appeal does not include the charging document for Count II -
Battery and the district court also could not find such a charging document. (R., 
p. 28.) 
3 Brown's Petition was untimely. It was filed more than 1 year and 42 days after 
the December 28, 2012 Judgment of Conviction. See I.C. § 19-4902(a); I.AR. 
14(a). Because Brown's Petition challenged the validity of his plea agreement 
and guilty plea, the period of retained jurisdiction, his Rule 35 Motion and his 
sentencing appeal did not serve to extend the time period. See State v. Green, 
156 Idaho 722, 724-726, 330 P. 3d 1080, 1082-1084 (2014). However, because 
it was not raised before the district court this statute of limitations defense is not 
before the appellate court. 
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conviction counsel. (R., pp. 21-24.) The district court denied his motion for post-
conviction counsel, holding in part, that Brown's claim was "plainly frivolous, and 
he is not entitled to representation at the public's expense." (R., p. 30.) The 
district court provided Brown 20 days to supplement his claim. (R., pp. 30-31.) 
The state moved for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp. 33-40.) Brown filed a 
response. (R., pp. 41-57.) The district court dismissed Brown's Petition with 
prejudice because there was no evidence that the court did not follow the plea 
agreement or that Brown's criminal counsel was ineffective. (R. pp. 58-67 .) 
Brown appealed. (R., pp. 68-71.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Brown states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Brown's petition for 
post-conviction relief, because the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the amended charge in the 
underlying case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Brown failed to show that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his 
new claim and has Brown failed to show the district court erred when it 
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Cannot Consider Brown's New Claim And The District Court Had 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction In The Separate Criminal Case 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Brown's Petition because there was no 
evidence that the plea agreement was breached and no evidence Brown's 
criminal counsel was ineffective. (R., pp. 58-63.) On appeal Brown now asserts 
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to take his guilty 
plea in the separate criminal case because the charge to which he pied guilty 
was not a lesser included charge of the original indictment. (Appellant's brief, p. 
7.) This claim fails because it was not raised below and is therefore not 
preserved and cannot be raised for the first time on post-conviction appeal. 
Even if the merits of Brown's unraised cause of action could be 
considered, the district court in Brown's criminal case did have subject matter 
jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea. The state filed an Information without a 
preliminary hearing. The failure to hold a preliminary hearing is not a 
jurisdictional defect. Brown's guilty plea waived any failure to hold a preliminary 
hearing and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
5 
C. Brown's Subject Matter Jurisdiction Claim Cannot Be Considered On 
Appeal Because It Was Not Set Forth In His Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
Under Idaho law a post-conviction petitioner claiming "[t]hat the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose sentence ... may institute ... a proceeding under this 
act to secure relief." I.C. §19-4901 (a). Claims not set forth in a petition for post-
conviction relief or an amended petition may not be considered on appeal. Small 
v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). Brown's 
Petition did not claim that the criminal court was without jurisdiction to impose 
sentence. (R., pp. 3-14.) Brown raises this claim for the first time on appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Brown's claim is therefore barred and he cannot now 
raise it for the first time on post-conviction appeal. 
Brown asserts that he is permitted to raise a subject matter jurisdiction 
claim for the first time on appeal and collaterally attack his criminal final 
judgment because subject matter jurisdiction is question of law that can be 
raised at anytime. (Appellant's brief, p. 7 (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 
757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).) Brown's assertion fails to acknowledge that a 
post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case from which it 
arises, rather, it is a separate civil action. See ~ Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 
791, 799, 291 P.3d 474, 482 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). None of the 
cases cited by Brown are post-conviction cases. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7-12 
(citing Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 101 P. 3d 699 (direct appeal); Bach v. Miller, 144 
Idaho 142, 158 P.3d 305 (2007) (direct appeal from a civil case); State v. Flegel, 
151 Idaho 525, 261 P. 3d 519 (2011) (direct appeal); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 
6 
244, 796 P.2d 121 (1990) (direct appeal); State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 
39 (1915) (direct appeal); State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P. 3d 1255 (2011) 
(direct appeal); State v. Schmierer, _ Idaho_, P. 3d _, 2014 Opinion 
No. 98, 2014 WL 6652924 (Ct. App. 2014) (direct appeal).) Brown does not cite 
any authority that permits a party in one case to raise a subject matter 
jurisdiction claim regarding a separate case at any time. Brown's claim was not 
raised before the district court and it cannot be considered on appeal. 
Brown's subject matter jurisdiction claim is also barred because it was not 
raised on direct criminal appeal. The jurisdiction of a court in a post-conviction 
proceeding to collaterally attack a final criminal judgment is limited. See 
Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997) (scope of post-
conviction relief is limited). It is well-settled in Idaho that a court has no 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment once the judgment becomes final 
unless a statute or rule extends its jurisdiction. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 
352, 354, 79 P.2d 711, 713 (2003). Under the post-conviction statute, any issue 
which could have, but was not, raised on direct appeal cannot be considered in 
post-conviction proceedings. I.C. § 19-4901 (b); see also Rodgers, 129 Idaho at 
725, 932 P.2d at 353. Subject matter jurisdiction, was not raised on direct 
appeal. See State v. Brown, Docket No. 41488, 2014 Unpublished Opinion, No. 
548 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) (Brown appealed the district court's decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction and the length of his sentence). Subject matter jurisdiction 
could have been raised on direct appeal. See 5LlL State v. Wolfe, _ Idaho 
_, _ P.3d, _, 2015 WL 659545 (Idaho 2015) (subject matter jurisdiction 
raised on direct appeal); Lewis v. State, 137 Idaho 882, 883-884, 55 P.3d 875, 
7 
876-877 (Ct. App. 2002) (subject matter jurisdiction raised on direct appeal could 
be raised on post-conviction). This Court does not have the jurisdiction to 
consider Brown's subject matter jurisdiction claim. 
Brown's subject matter jurisdiction claim was not raised in his post-
conviction petition and was not raised on direct appeal in the criminal case and 
therefore it cannot be considered for the first time in this post-conviction appeal. 
D. The District Court Did Not Lose Subject Matter Jurisdiction When The 
State Filed An Information To Comply With The Written Plea Agreement 
Even if this Court considers the merits of Brown's new claim, the district 
court is properly affirmed. Brown agues the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the charge to which he pied guilty. (Appellant's brief, p. 
8.) The state charged Brown with the crime of Forcible Sexual Penetration by 
Use of a Foreign Object, Felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6608. (41488 
R., p. 20.) Pursuant to written plea agreement, the state filed an Information 
alleging felony Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child. (41488 R., pp. 60-
61, 74-76.) Brown pied guilty to Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child. 
(R., p. 59; 41488 R., pp. 74-76.) Brown now claims the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the felony Domestic Battery in the Presence of a 
Child because it was a "different offense than that alleged in the original 
Indictment and the Information was not based on a commitment by a magistrate 
following a preliminary hearing or its waiver." (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
In support of his argument Brown primarily relies upon two cases. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12 (citing Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P. 3d 519; 
Schmierer, _ Idaho _, _ P. 3d _, 2014 Opinion No. 98, 2014 WL 
8 
6652924.) Neither are applicable here because Brown did not plead guilty to an 
amended Indictment. 
Flegel was indicated by a grand jury for the crime of lewd conduct with a 
child under sixteen years of age ("Lewd Conduct"). Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526, 
261 P.3d at 520. The district court instructed the jury regarding the crime of 
Lewd Conduct and, as a lesser included offense, sexual abuse of a child under 
sixteen years of age ("Sexual Abuse"). l!;L The jury found Flegel not guilty of 
Lewd Conduct but could not reach a verdict on Sexual Abuse. & "Without 
resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended indictment 
charging Flegel with the crime of Sexual Abuse." l!;L A second jury found Flegel 
guilty of Sexual Abuse. & The Idaho Supreme Court reversed and held: 
Because Sexual Abuse is not a lesser included offense of Lewd 
Conduct, Flegel could only be validly charged by indictment with 
that crime if the matter was resubmitted to a grand jury and it 
returned the amended indictment. The prosecuting attorney had no 
authority to issue an amended indictment for a crime that was not 
charged in the original indictment and that was not an included 
offense of that crime. Therefore, Flegel's conviction is void, the 
judgment must be vacated, and this case must be dismissed. 
l!;L The Court held that a prosecutor should not be allowed to "amend an 
indictment to charge an offense other than that for which the defendant was held 
to answer would permit the prosecutor to, in essence, become the grand jury." 
l!;L at 526-527, 261 P.3d at 520-521.4 
4 Flegel is further distinguished because the district court in Flegel lost jurisdiction 
because the jury acquitted Flegel of the charges in the Indictment and thus the 
Indictment was a completely dead letter by the time the prosecutor attempted to 
amend it after the first trial. Because there was no similar jurisdiction ending 
event in Schmeirer, the state believes Schmeirer was wrongly decided. 
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Schmierer was indicted by a grand jury for one count of enticing children 
over the internet ("Enticement") and one count of attempted lewd conduct with a 
minor under the age of sixteen (Attempted Lewd Conduct"). Schmierer, 2014 
WL 6652924 at *1. "Pursuant to plea negotiations, and without resubmitting the 
matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended superseding indictment in 
which Count 11, attempted lewd conduct, was stricken and a second charge of 
enticing children over the Internet was substituted. Schmierer agreed to plead 
guilty to both counts of enticing children over the Internet as charged in the 
amended indictment." kl The Court of Appeals held: 
The State was without authority to file the amended indictment. 
Where an indictment is invalid, the district court is without subject 
matter jurisdiction. Therefore, not having been issued by a grand 
jury, the amended indictment was invalid, and the district court was 
without subject matter jurisdiction over the second count of Internet 
enticement. 
kl at *4 (citing I.C.R. 7(e); I.C. § 19-1420, Flegel, 151 Idaho at 531,261 P.3d at 
525.) Schmierer is not yet final. On December 15, 2014 the state petitioned the 
Idaho Supreme Court for review of Schmierer. The petition for review is 
pending. 
Neither Schmierer nor Flegel control the outcome here. In both Schmierer 
and Flegel the court was concerned about the prosecutor acting as the grand 
jury and the prosecutor's power to file an Indictment without convening a grand 
jury. Here the prosecutor did not file an Amended Indictment. The prosecutor 
instead filed an Information. (No. 41488, R., pp. 60-61.) 
Brown argues that filing the Information without a preliminary hearing 
deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Appellant's brief, 
10 
pp. 10-11.) Brown is incorrect. An Information requires a preliminary hearing. 
See I.C. § 19-1308. The failure to hold a preliminary hearing does not raise 
questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 4-5, 
244 P. 3d 145, 148-149 (2010) (citing In re Marshall, 6 Idaho 516, 56 P. 470 
(1899) (the failure to hold a preliminary hearing does not raise subject matter 
jurisdiction issues because a defendant can waive the right to a preliminary 
hearing or an indictment by a grand jury). Questions of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived. See State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420, 
272 P.3d 382, 392 (2012) (citing State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 
1127, 1131 (2004)). However, the right to waive a preliminary hearing is well-
established. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995); 
see also State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 
1983). An Information can be filed if a person waives their right to a preliminary 
examination. I.C. § 19-1308. 
§ 19-1308. Preliminary examination necessary 
No information shall be filed against any person for any offense 
until such person shall have had a preliminary examination 
therefor, as provided by law, before a justice of the peace, or other 
examining magistrate or officer, unless such person shall waive 
his right to such examination: provided, that information may be 
filed without such examination against fugitives from justice, and 
any fugitive from justice against whom an information shall be filed 
may be demanded by the governor of this state of the executive 
authority of any other state or territory, or of any foreign 
government, in the same manner, and the same proceedings may 
be had thereon, as provided by law in like cases of demand upon 
indictment filed. 
I.C. § 19-1308 (emphasis added). Since a preliminary hearing can be waived, 
the failure to hold a preliminary hearing cannot be a jurisdictional defect. 
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The only question is whether Brown waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing. It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and 
understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, 
whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. State v. Dunlap, 123 
Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 
671 P. 2d at 1106. 
In Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction 
because of a defect in the preliminary hearing process. Fowler claimed "the 
magistrate committed prejudicial error in letting the state amend the complaint 
against him - to include the restaurant burglary charge - during the course of the 
preliminary hearing." Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals concluded Fowler waived his right to challenge the probable 
cause determination regarding the added charge once he pied guilty: 
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his 
right to contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of 
a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable 
cause to require the accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a 
valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all 
non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or 
statutory, in prior proceedings. Here Fowler does not attack the 
entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of guilty to the 
restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the 
procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived 
the preliminary hearing itself, on that charge. 
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations 
omitted). 
Brown pied guilty to the charge of Domestic Battery in the Presence of a 
Child. (R., p. 59.) And since failure to hold a preliminary hearing is not a 
jurisdictional defect, Brown's guilty plea waived his right to a preliminary hearing 
12 
on the charge of Domestic Battery in the Presence of a Child. See Dunlap, 123 
Idaho at 399, 848 P.2d at 457; Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P. 2d at 1106; 
Pierce, 150 Idaho at 4-5, 244 P. 3d at 148-149. There was no jurisdictional 
defect and the district court had jurisdiction to accept Brown's guilty plea and 
enter judgment. 
The state was not barred by Idaho Code § 19-1420 and Idaho Criminal 
Rule 7(e) from filing the Information alleging Domestic Battery in the Presence of 
a Child. Idaho Code § 19-1420 and Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) prohibit amending 
an indictment or information so as to charge a different offense. See I.C.R. 7(e); 
I.C. § 19-1420. Idaho Code § 19-1420 and Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) do not 
prohibit a prosecutor from filing a new charge and proceeding to grand jury or 
preliminary hearing on the new charge. Here the prosecutor did not amend the 
indictment, but instead filed a new charge to which Brown waived preliminary 
hearing and plead guilty. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
accept Brown's guilty plea pursuant to his Rule 11 plea agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
judgment. 
DATED this 4th day of March 2015. 
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